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COMMERCIAL NORMS AND THE
FINE ART OF THE SMALL CON
Comments on Daniel Keating's
'Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action'
Douglas G. Baird*
The standard battle-of-the-forms story, often rehearsed in the
classroom, is one in which merchants try to take advantage of their
contracting opposites. A seller wants to escape the obligations that
come with implied terms and seeks to disclaim them in its acknowl
edgment form. Its buyers do not realize they have been had until after
the goods fail. Only then do they read the seller's form and discover
that they are without remedy. Conspicuously absent in Dan Keating's
fine article, however, is any evidence that supports this story.1 Some
of his merchants talk about putting favorable terms in their forms, but
only as a way of counteracting the effect of another form. Nothing
suggests a Darwinian struggle in which each seeks to take advantage
of another.
There are several explanations. It is possible that the battle goes
on, but Keating failed to find it. The large corporations in his sample
are unlikely to be victims of forms and are unlikely to have general
counsel that admit to using forms to their benefit. Alternatively, evi
dence may be missing because existing law does its job, more or less.
When both parties are even modestly sophisticated, most courts em
ploy some version of a knockout rule. And, by the time the dust set
tles, we end up with the Code's default rules.2 Under section 2-207,
courts do not take what forms say seriously. If courts do not take
forms seriously, we should not expect the parties to either. If, how
ever, we create a regime in which we allow parties to opt out of default
rules easily, the battle may become important.
* Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
B.A. 1975, Yale; J.D. 1979, Stanford. - Ed. I thank Robert Ellickson, Dan Keating, Ronald
Mann, Hugh Patinkin, Robert Rasmussen, Carol Rose, and David Skeel for their help, and
the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for research
support.

1. See Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2678(2000).
2, See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1984). One should
be careful not to overclaim here. As White & Summers point out, there is no way to inter
pret section 2-2CJ7 as preventing one party, on some occasions, from imposing terms on the
other that do not work to their mutual benefit. See 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-3, at 31 (4th ed. 1995).
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We should, however, take seriously the possibility that Keating
found no evidence because the battle of the forms and related activi
ties are not important vehicles for those inclined to advantage-taking.
If the risk that merchants will use forms to their advantage is small, we
should, as we talk about revising section 2-207, focus.more of our at
tention on the way legal rules can help parties shape terms in ways
that work to their mutual benefit.3 The less we think that advantage
taking is a problem, the more we will be able to provide a set of rules
that enable parties to customize terms. Trading one concern off
against another is inevitable. Indeed, the failure of section 2-207 stems
in large measure from the drafters trying to make one section do too
much work.4
In these comments, I identify the terrain on which the battle of the
forms operates and suggest that, once we take the motivations of those
inclined to mischief into account, we should be wary of focusing too
much on parties taking advantage of each other with forms. The
problem likely exists in some measure and ensuring against the worst
abuses is prudent, but we need to keep the problem in perspective.
You make more money by selling people things that they do not
need than you do by pretending to give them what they want and then
taking it away in fine print. Harold Hill in The Music Man made his
money by persuading a town that it needed a boy's band. He did not
seek out places where people already wanted to buy seventy-six trom
bones and then proceed to sell them defective ones. A vision of com
mercial law that worries excessively about the ability of parties to
sneak terms past each other distracts us from the things that matter.
I.

THE TERRAIN ON WHICH THE BATILE OF THE FORMS
IS FOUGHT

It is a commonplace that legal rules do not operate in a vacuum.
To understand the effects of a battle-of-the-forms rule, we first need
to identify the forces that already are at work. There are two impor
tant forces that limit the mischief that might be done through the use
of forms: the constraints that norms impose and the constraints of le
gal sanctions outside of commercial law, such as those for fraud and
misrepresentation.

3. For an examination of how such diversity might work in the consumer context, see
George L. Priest, A Theory of Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE LJ. 1297 (1981).

G.

4. See Douglas
Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the
Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982).
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The Force of Commercial Norms

Commercial law rules affect only those who are around for the
long term. Those interested in making a quick killing are likely to be
out of the jurisdiction or judgment-proof by the time people catch up
with them.5 Once a person leaves the jurisdiction or is judgment
proof, causes of action do not matter. Rules governing the battle of
the forms matter only when the person who wins the battle remains on
the scene.
Those who are in business for any length of time, however, must
worry about their reputations. The cases in which legal sanctions mat
ter are those in which reputational forces are necessarily also at work.6
Moreover, parties are most likely to invest in their reputations in envi
ronments where the other party fears advantage-taking. An experi
ence in my own life brought this lesson home to me.
Many years ago, towards the end of his life, my father wanted to
give my mother a piece of jewelry on her birthday. An emerald and
diamond pin he saw in a Tiffany's catalogue caught his eye, and he
clipped out the picture and sent it to Norm, a jeweler with whom he
previously had done business. Norm made a similar pin for a price
that, while less than Tiffany's, was hardly insubstantial, and my father
entrusted it to me for safekeeping.
I had never been impressed with Norm. Norm had a small and
somewhat seedy shop, and much of his business was in wholeselling
items such as tasteless pins in the shape of an American flag with semi
precious red, white, and blue stones. Moreover, the opportunity for
advantage-taking was nontrivial. My father was in search of a deal.
He wanted a pin like the one from Tiffany's, but for less. Addition
ally, he was quite ill and did not know much about jewelry. He was
not in a position to cast a sharp eye on the transaction.
Because of my doubts (and because I interpreted my father's
charge to care for the pin broadly), I took it to a well-known jeweler
on North Michigan Avenue in Chicago. This jeweler examined the
pin closely and, after some study, shook his head and told me he had
bad news. Emeralds were a very soft stone and mounting them this
way was extremely tricky. Unfortunately (but not surprisingly), two of
the emeralds had fractured while being mounted. He handed me a
magnifying glass and invited me to see for myself. I thought I saw
what he was talking about, but was not sure. The jeweler suggested
that I return the pin and ask to have the emeralds replaced.

5. From the time of Charles Ponzi to the present day, con artists are usually broke by
the time they can be brought to court. See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924).
6. This observation, of course, is not new. The locus c/assicus in this literature remains
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
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At that moment, I had little hope that Norm would replace the
stones. The flaws were invisible or nearly so. I was not sure I could
persuade Norm that the fractures were there. Moreover, the price my
father paid and the problems with the mount might be connected with
each other. We acquired the pin at a favorable price, because the
quality was not first-rate. We should not have thought that the pin
from Norm would be comparable to one from Tiffany's. I said as
much to the Michigan Avenue jeweler, more or less expecting him to
agree and suggest, with some condescension, that, in the future, we
should rely on upscale jewelers like him. His response, however, was
nothing of the sort. A dark look came over him, as if I had impugned
his entire profession. "Your jeweler will replace the stones. I am not
talking about the design or the quality of the stones. The emeralds
have fractures in them. It doesn't matter what you paid. A jeweler
would never knowingly let such a pin leave his store. Never."
I did not have to explain to Norm why I was returning the pin. Be
fore I said anything, Norm examined the pin. After a few moments,
he stopped, took what seemed a long time to collect his thoughts, and
then began to talk. He owed me an apology. He had let my father
down. The emeralds had fractures in them, and the pin should never
have left the shop. The fault, he told me, was entirely his. He had not
personally inspected the pin. This had been his practice for decades,
but of late he had started to delegate too much business to his sons.
They weren't ready. Then he asked for my mother's birthday. He
needed to find new stones and wanted to be sure the pin was ready in
time.
Like other merchants, jewelers are constrained by powerful norms.
Norm's shop was seedy, because he was largely in the wholesale busi
ness. The jeweler on North Michigan Avenue had a fancy shop and a
reputation. All Norm had was his reputation. Jewelers have to care
intensely about their reputations precisely because their goods are
hard to assess. The same force that made us vulnerable (our inability
to judge the pin on our own) also made it much more important for
Norm to build a reputation that is put at risk if commercial norms are
broken.
We need to assess default rules such as the implied warranty of
merchantability against this backdrop. It might have been possible to
bring an action against Norm if he refused to replace the emeralds.
The pin, after all, did not pass without objection in the trade.7 But the
same norm that gave rise to the legal right made it unnecessary. For
all I knew, Norm had a form that disclaimed the implied warranty of
merchantability, but such a disclaimer was irrelevant as long as reputa
tional forces ensured that he would make amends if his goods did not
pass in his trade.
·

7. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a) (1999).
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In addition to the need to preserve a reputation for fair dealing,
other forces are at work. Among the most important are criminal
sanctions. A jeweler in Norm's position could, in theory, have pro
vided us with fake stones and escaped detection most of the time.
Similarly, he could have provided stones that weighed less or were of a
different grade than he represented. These forms of advantage-taking,
however, rely on affirmative misrepresentations that give rise to
criminal sanctions.8 It takes only one customer to get a second opinion
for the entire business to unravel.
Apart from criminal sanctions, other legal rules constrain those
who are tempted to engage in affirmative misrepresentations. A seller
cannot make a set of representations during the course of selling a
product and then seek to escape legal liability by adding terms in
forms. Rules governing false advertising and fraud prevent such de
liberate misconduct.9 Moreover, representations that become part of
the basis of the bargain are express warranties under U.C.C. section 2313, and cannot be disclaimed. Similarly, limitations on liability for
personal injury from consumer goods cannot easily be evaded either.10
Rules governing forms matter only if the contracting party is
around long enough to be subject to the legal process, but not con
strained by norms. Moreover, the advantage-taking must fall short of
deliberate misrepresentations that trigger other legal regimes. The
advantage-taking at which battle-of-the-forms rules have to be aimed
must fall into the gap between these forces. The game that is being
played is a "small con." One sells substandard products or services
and escapes responsibility when things go badly through the fine print.
One makes money, not by making a big lie, but by appearing to offer
one thing, while actually being obliged to supply something far less.
We focus on this sort of advantage-taking in the next part.
II.

PRINCIPLES OF THE SMALL CON

The advantage-taking of concern to us is analogous to an unscru
pulous seller offering insurance to the unsophisticated. The limita
tions on coverage in the fine print are not contrary to what the seller
represented, but in the aggregate they insulate the insurer from liabil
ity in the cases that matter. Most people who buy insurance never file
any claims. They are none the wiser. The few that make claims dis8. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 190.20(McKinney 1999).
9. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW§ 350-a (1988 & Supp. 2000).
10. Among other things, it is presumptively unconscionable under U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
As White and Summers have put it, "we suspect that whenever a consumer's blood is spilled,
even wild horses could not stop a sympathetic court from plowing through the most artfully
drafted and conspicuously printed disclaimer clause . . . ." 1 WlilTE & SUMMERS, supra note
2, § 12-12, at 681. In such a world, unscrupulous sellers are not going to count on language in
forms to protect them.
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cover that they are not covered, but they think it their bad luck to
have suffered a misfortune that was beyond the coverage of the policy.
They also disappear.
Misbehavior of this sort undoubtedly exists in the sale of goods.
The question, however, is whether it arises often enough such that
curbing such abuse should be our primary objective. One way to ap
proach this question is to look at the motivations of those inclined to
mischief.11 We are concerned about the advantage-taking that is too
small to be stopped by reputational forces and too venial to fall within
criminal and regulatory sanctions.
A.

The Willie Sutton Principle

Our legal system embodies a general reluctance to review a trans
action to assess the fairness of the price at which goods are sold. Con
sumers may, on occasion, be able to argue that the terms of a transac
tion are substantively unconscionable.12
Merchants may have a
remedy under the antitrust laws if a seller has acquired its monopoly
position illegitimately. In the main, however, parties are free to sell
their goods at whatever price they please.13
I can sell a necklace for $15,000, even if others sell virtually the

same piece for $10,000. I can sell a laptop computer for the same price
as my competitors and not disclose that my disk drive is cheaper, my
chips are slower, and my housing is less sturdy. I can charge $5 a fifth
for my standard brand of vodka and $10 for the premium brand, even
if they come from the same tap. Our unwillingness to review these
transactions undoubtedly gives some people the ability to take advan
tage of others.
We tolerate this state of affairs because the game is not worth the
candle. Allowing review of the price charged after the fact is not that
much different from price regulation. We have little confidence that
the government will be able to control prices effectively. As a concep
tual matter, this principle suggests we should be reluctant to make it
hard for parties to opt out of default terms. We need to explain why
regulation of terms is different from price regulation.
Courts and legislatures may be no more able to identify the type of
warranty that should accompany a good than they can identify the
price at which goods can be sold. A seller might try to take advantage
11. The idea that we can use the practices of swindlers as a lens to examine co=ercial
behavior begins with ARTHUR ALLEN LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING (1976).
12 See, e.g., American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964).
White and Su=ers, however, report that, of late, even these cases have "dwindled to a
trickle." 1 WlllTE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 4-5, at 223.
13. Again, one wants to be careful not to overclaim. Courts sometimes do take action
when they perceive an exchange to be gravely one-sided. See James Gordley, Equality in
Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1587, 1649-55 (1981).
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of me by selling me a laptop computer with components that are not
as good as that of a competitor's. Alternatively, this seller might try to
sell the same computer, but with less favorable warranty terms and
more limited remedies. A coherent approach to the battle of the
forms and similar problems has to be able to explain why we need to
worry about the second case, but not the first.14
The freedom that a seller has to vary the price and quality of the
goods brings an additional puzzle. We have to explain why someone
who wants to take advantage of others plays games with warranties
(and the remedies that are available in the event of breach), rather
than price. The law does nothing to prevent someone from taking a
product that is not so well made (even though it is not so bad as to
violate implied warranties or give rise to any other contract remedy)
and charge as much as the market will bear. Given this freedom, sell
ers may often discover that they gain little by disclaiming warranties
and limiting damages. When it is easy to take advantage of buyers
without violating any warranties or breaking any promises, remedies
for breach are not so important.
For most goods, the chance of defects that give rise to warranty ac
tions and the like is low. The "insurance" that implied terms provide
is only a small part of the total package. With few goods is it likely to
be worth even ten percent of the price of the goods. A seller intent on
taking advantage of buyers should have many better ways of short
changing buyers other than playing with forms. Goods that are fungi
ble are easy to inspect and, hence, the implied warranty matters little.
For complex goods such as computers, it is easy to use low quality ma
terials (such as slower chips) and shave costs in this way, rather than
try to use forms. In more competitive markets, buyers may be sensi
tive to chip speeds, but they are likely to ask about warranties as well
and, as we have seen, affirmative misrepresentations about these in
dependently trigger legal liability. The Code's default terms are an in
surance policy that is tied to the sale of something else worth ten times
as much. For sellers inclined to mischief, the stakes involved with de
fault terms are an order of magnitude smaller than the goods them
selves. They are not likely to invest their energy here.
Even when warranties matter, it does not follow that badly moti
vated sellers seek to avoid them. Quite the contrary. Just as an un
scrupulous seller can provide second-rate (but merchantable) goods at
a premium price, the same seller can provide a second-rate warranty
(often called a "service contract") at a premium price.15 Once one is
committed to the idea that we are not going to assess whether the
14. The idea here - that a warranty can be treated as another product attribute - is a
familiar one. See Arthur Allen Leff, Contract As Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970).
15. See Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983).
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price being charged is appropriate given the service that is being ren
dered, the law is limited in what it can do.
Legal rules can make buyers' lives easier by requiring various pro
visions to be conspicuous. Buyers benefit when competing sellers
highlight their own terms. But it is hard for legal rules to do more. In
any event, the potential for abuse with warranties in many markets is
not so much that sellers will disclaim them, but rather that they will of
fer them, charge too much, and limit them in ways that are hard to
regulate. General rules governing forms in contracting are not well
suited to dealing with such problems.
Once when veteran bank robber Willie Sutton was arrested, a re
porter asked why he robbed banks. Willie told him, "That's where the
money is." If one wants to take advantage of people and profit by it,
one naturally looks to arenas that promise the most in the way of
profits. The battle of the forms may not be such a venue. We can re
turn to my experience with Norm.
If Norm had been inclined towards sharp practices, he had many
chances to take advantage of us without disclaiming legal obligations.
The pin was custom-made. My father had no benchmark other than
the Tiffany's price to assess whether Norm was charging a fair price.
If Norm were inclined to take advantage of my father, he simply could
have charged more for it. Alternatively, he could have used cheaper
stones or lower quality mounts. These avenues would not have put his
reputation at risk to nearly the same extent.
B.

Roping the Mark

"Big cons" are confidence games in which a single individual is
separated from a lot of money. They depend crucially on finding rich
people willing to enter schemes that are illicit in one way or another.16
Small cons, in contrast, often focus on the weak and the poor. One
gets rich by cheating many people a little bit at a time. Disclosure
rules can make this harder. We can curtail some of the abuse with
regulations that force disclosures. The Truth-in-Lending Act requires
that the annual percentage rate be disclosed.17 The Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act requires warranty disclaimers to be made conspicu
ously.18 We also regulate the way goods are packaged and labeled.19

16. See W.T. BRANNON, "YELLOW KID" WEIL 293-94(1948).
17. 15u. s. c. §1632(1994).
18. 15u. s. c. §§2301-2312(1994).
19. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§392-d (McKinney 1996). Yellow Kid Weil's moni
ker came from his practice of selling gold-plated watches and cheap jewelry for large
amounts using the story that he was trying to unload stolen goods. See DAVID W. MAURER,
THE BIG CON: THE STORY OF TIIE CONFIDENCE MAN AND TIIE CONFIDENCE GAME 274
(1940). Weil credited a large part of his success in this venture to the absence of legal rules
that prevented manufacturers from stamping any thing they pleased on watches and jewelry.
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In such a world, a successful con artist has to identify a discrete set
of people who are vulnerable. Marketing goods to the whole does not
allow one to do this. An unscrupulous seller has a hard time taking
advantage of the ignorant if they are buying the same goods in the
same marketplace as Fortune 500 companies. It is sometimes thought
that consumers are worse off when they buy in a mass market and are
forced to take terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.20 In many cases, ex
actly the opposite is true. Unsophisticated consumers are often better
off in a market in which no one can bargain for special terms than in a
market where everyone can. I am more likely to enjoy terms that are
mutually beneficial when I buy a computer with terms that the manu
facturer imposes on everyone, including large companies, than when I
and every other customer can dicker with the same manufacturer indi
vidually. Hence, sellers inclined to mischief in the terms they use are
not likely to enter markets where they deal with a broad array of po
tential buyers on identical terms.
Far more promising are arenas in which gullible buyers can be
separated from savvy ones. General rules governing the use of pre
printed terms do little with respect to places where abuse is likely and
too much where it is not. The legal rules that curb misbehavior most
effectively are often ones that regulate discrete markets. Misleading
statements made in connection with the sale of insurance is subject to
special criminal sanctions.21 Consumer credit is closely regulated.22
We are much more likely to be successful if we regulate door-to-door
sales practices by insisting on cooling-off periods for such sales.23 We
may be better off banning cross-collateralization clauses as unfair
trade practices than we would be allowing individual buyers to assert
that such clauses are substantively unconscionable.24
C.

Cooling Out the Mark

The key to playing any con game is ensuring that the deception
lasts long enough. A large part of the swindler's craft lies in his ability
to do this. It is known as "cooling out the mark."25 When one is en
gaged in a less-than-honorable transaction in the marketplace and is
See

BRANNON, supra note 16, at 9. Later in life, he boasted that he was
responsible for many of these laws. See id. at 295.

in

some measure

20. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
21. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW§176.05(McKinney 1999).
22. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. §§444.1-444.5 (2000).
23. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. §429.1 (2000).
24. The unconscionability holdings of cases like Williams v. Walker-Thomas F11rnit11re
Cir. 1965), are made largely unnecessary by 16 C.F.R. §§444.1-444.5.

Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.

25. See LEFF, supra note 11, at 87, 100, 154 & 160; MAURER, s11pra note 19, at 279.
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subject to legal action, keeping marks happy is especially important.
The best cons are the ones in which the marks never know that they
have been swindled.26 It is not as hard as it might seem. People want
to believe that they have received a good deal. They do not want to
think that they have been duped. Even when they know they have
been cheated, they do not want others to know and are reluctant to
invoke whatever legal rights they have on that account.
To return to the example of the emerald pin, let us assume that we
have a jeweler with bad motives. In addition to, or instead of, using
inferior stones and other tactics that do not violate any implied terms,
this jeweler wants to profit by selling jewels with fractures in them.
Such a jeweler can rely in the first place upon most buyers never
checking the goods out. Among other things, buyers as a general mat
ter believe in their own powers of judgment.27 The spouse that re
ceives the pin as a birthday gift is unlikely to have suspicions either.
Even when buyers have suspicions, the unscrupulous often can allay
them, especially with respect to details (such as nearly invisible frac
tures) that require expertise.
The worst-case scenario may be one in which a third party enters
the picture unexpectedly, such as an over-eager lawyer-academic pos
sessed of a strong sense of filial obligation, a large amount of suspi
cion, and plenty of free time. Even in this case, however, the unscru
pulous need not rely on legal niceties. In such cases, they may be
better off fixing (or pretending to fix) the defect, rather than insisting
that they do not have to.
Buyers invoke their rights under implied terms such as the war
ranty of merchantability only if they know that their goods are defec
tive. If there are express promises, disclaimers of off-the-rack terms
are irrelevant. If the buyer never notices the defect, the implied war
ranty does the buyer no good. Even if the buyer learns about the de
fect, the warranty again matters only if the seller insists on holding the
buyer to the preprinted forms. To win the battle of the forms, the un
scrupulous must ultimately be willing to invoke defenses such as dis
claimers and remedy limitations in open court. Con men, however,
rarely want to do this and in any event cannot count on success, quite
apart from the letter of the law.
The latest attempt to replace section 2-207 seems to take these
concerns into account. On its face, it does seem to focus on advan
tage-taking. If terms in material accompanying a product contradict

26. Indeed, it is often hard to convince a mark that he has been "knocked" (i.e.,
cheated). See MAURER, supra note 19, at 285. As Maurer explains, "[i]f the insideman han
dles the blow-off properly, the mark hardly knows that he has been fleeced. No good in
sideman wants any trouble with a mark. He wants him to lose his money the 'easy way'
rather than the 'hard way'
" Id. at 157.
. . . .

27. See id. at 133.
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the terms of the parties' agreement or materially alter the contract to
the detriment of the buyer, they do not bind the buyer. Moreover, the
terms that accompany the goods become part of the contract only sev
eral weeks after the buyer receives the goods. Before that time, buy
ers can return the goods at the seller's expense. These provisions,
however, are likely to interfere little with sellers who want to depart
from default terms in ways that are mutually beneficial. We know that
the risk that a buyer will ship the goods back is trivial and the limita
tions on what terms become part of the contract, if sensibly inter
preted, should not affect sellers trying to craft terms that are mutually
beneficial. We may end up with a provision that, in substance, allows
merchants to customize terms.
Ill.

CONCLUSION

Attempts to regulate the battle of the forms focus on the wrong
place, an arena in which there is relatively less profit for the unscru
pulous, and the wrong mechanism, a cause of action for money dam
ages by those who often do not even know they have been cheated.
To be sure, some can get the better of others with forms, but those
who seek to profit at the expense of others are not likely to focus their
efforts here.
Richard Sears of Sears-Roebuck fame grew rich by selling cata
logue goods with money-back guarantees. One of his popular prod
ucts was the Heidelberg Belt, an electrical device that was buckled
around the waist. If the belts did not cure their impotency, buyers
were free to return them. Only three ever did. As Sears observed to
ward the end of his life, "[h]onesty is the best policy. I know. I've
tried it both ways."28

28. DONALD R.
SEARS 9-10 (1987).
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